Was the consolidation of defense industry in the 1990s driven by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) directives, or was it driven instead by the same forces that drove consolidation in many other sectors of the U.S. economy in the 1990s? To better understand the roles of DOD policy and economy-wide forces in shaping the U.S. defense industry, we test for structural breaks in defense industry and spending data and compare our findings to those relating to other sectors and the general economy. We identify structural breaks in the defense-related data in the early 1980s and throughout the 1990s, roughly consistent with changes in the U.S. economy, including broader merger trends. Overall, our results are more consistent with the view that economy-wide factors drove defense industry consolidation, largely independent of the DOD policy changes that occurred early in the 1990s.
Introduction
In this paper we test for structural breaks in U.S. defense industry and spending data over the last five decades. The defense industry data, which include various measures of market concentration, capture trends in consolidation; the spending data, defined broadly to include measures of contract awards, budget authority, and expenditures and investment, capture trends in market size. We identify structural breaks in those data and compare them to structural breaks found in data relating to the rest of the economy to address a lingering debate among defense analysts, policy practitioners, and executives as to the forces behind the consolidation of the defense industry in the 1990s. Was the consolidation the result of an explicit directive of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) or was it driven by the same forces that led to consolidation in many sectors of the U.S. economy in the 1990s? In an era in which concerns about the future of the defense industry are again prominent, the answer bears directly on whether and how the DOD might choose to engage as a policymaking and procuring agency. If broader economic forces drive industry behavior, the DOD may face limitations in promoting competition, spurring innovation, or otherwise shaping the defense industry. We interpret structural breaks in the data as indicative of changes in defense spending, the defense industry at large, and the broader economy, which, in the context of two stylized narratives, provides a statistical approach to explaining defense-industry consolidation.
The first stylized narrative, representing what we refer to as the "DOD-policycentric" view, describes the DOD as the primary engineer of defense industry consolidation in the 1990s. The defense budget had been declining steadily since the mid-1980s and the DOD was seeking to reduce excess capacity and check rising costs. In response, at a 1993 dinner now referred to as the "Last Supper," the DOD asserted its support for industry-wide consolidation (see Augustine (1997 Augustine ( , 2006 for an eyewitness account). The DOD backed its assertion by agreeing to reimburse firms for some merger-related costs and, later, through antitrust oversight (for discussions see Gholz and Sapolsky (1999-2000) , Markusen and Costigan (1999) and Markusen (1997) ). Without explicitly denying the relevance of economy-wide factors, this narrative claims DOD policy as the dominant factor in the consolidation process. For example, the former chairman of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, Norman R. Augustine, characterizes the Last Supper as perhaps "the most critical moment in the defense industry's consolidation" (Augustine (1997) ). His comments suggest that the defense industry was hesitant to consolidate, even when faced with a declining budget, without encouragement from its largest purchaser, the DOD. 1 In contrast, a stylized "economy-centric" view places economy-wide phenomenon at the center of a story in which the same forces that drove the large number of mergers in the rest of U.S. economy also drove the consolidation of the defense industry in the 1990s. Such forces included developments in capital markets, innovation in technology, and deregulation (see Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) for details on merger activity in the U.S. economy). While the economy-centric view does not dismiss the impact of the decline in the defense budget, or the response of the DOD to that decline, it suggests that other forces provide a more telling explanation of defense-industry consolidation. Hensel (2007) , for example, offers evidence that defense industry mergers in the 1990s are more correlated with economy-wide mergers than with DOD spending (see also Flamm (1998) and Oden (1998) for relevant discussions of evidence that is supportive of an economy-wide perspective).
We use the methods of Perron (1998, 2003) to estimate structural breaks in data that measure defense industry consolidation, defense spending, and economy-wide trends. First, we test for structural breaks in six different indicators of consolidation.
These data include the concentration ratios of the top-4 and top-100 recipients of prime contract awards from DOD; that is, the collective market shares of the top-4 and top-100 DOD contractors, respectively, ranked by the dollar value of their awards. For a complementary perspective, we also construct and test two new time series, the aggregate number of subsidiaries of the top-4 and top-100 firms. Lastly, for robustness with respect to the two concentration ratios, we construct and test Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) values for the top-4 and top-100 firms. 1 This being a stylized narrative, it would be incorrect to attribute it, in its purest form, to any one person or group of people; rather, it represents an amalgam of statements focused on the role of the DOD in directing consolidation. For example, taking a softer tone a decade later, Augustine (2006) describes the consolidation as "inevitable" by virtue of the declining defense budget and credits the Last Supper with hastening the inevitable. He does not, however, consider broader economy-wide forces as contributing to that inevitability. Other statements tending toward a DOD-centric perspective can be found in Deutch (2001) and, to a lesser extent, General Accounting Office (1998), both of which also speak to the decline in the defense budget, but emphasize the DOD's leadership.
Next, as indicative of defense spending, we test for breaks in the real dollar value of DOD contract awards, DOD budget authority, real federal defense consumption expenditures, and real federal defense gross investment. The last two series, both subcomponents of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), provide alternative perspectives on defense spending.
Lastly, as indicative of broader economic phenomenon, we test for breaks in the number and dollar value of all mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. economy and for breaks in total U.S. budget authority.
If DOD policy was the dominant driver of change in the industry, we would expect to see breaks in the consolidation data consistent with the policy changes that emerged in 1993. From a DOD-policy-centric perspective, the consolidation of the industry might then be seen as a direct response to DOD's policy actions and an indirect response to the budgetary decline. Alternatively, if economy-wide forces drove the change, we would expect to find consolidation-related breaks consistent with breaks found in other sectors of the U.S. economy or consistent with breaks found in merger activity in the U.S. economy overall.
2 Lastly, regardless of the strength of either narrative on consolidation,
we might expect to find a break in the spending data in the mid-1980s, marking a steady decline in the defense budget that began in or around 1985.
Overall, we find consistent evidence of breaks primarily in the mid-1990s and, to a lesser extent, in the early to mid-1980s. In particular, structural breaks in the concentration ratio of the top-4 firms, in the number of subsidiaries for the top-4 firms, and in the HHI measures in the mid-1990s are matched by a structural break in the number of mergers in the U.S. economy found in 1995. Though one could argue the timing is consistent with the DOD-policy-centric view, the preponderance of breaks found in the mid-1990s and their estimated confidence intervals suggest, in our interpretation, a closer link to broader economic activity (we discuss the details of the break results in Section 3). Moreover, we find some evidence of structural breaks in the same series at various dates in the 1980s suggesting the consolidation of the defense industry in the 1990s may have had its antecedents in 1980s.
The break analysis in this paper provides novel statistical evidence on the timing of change in the defense industry relative to changes in the defense budget over time and with respect to the broader economy. 3 On balance, the break dates we estimate suggest a correspondence between changes in the defense industry, defense spending, and the broader economy, especially as embodied in mergers and acquisitions data. While certainly not ruling out the relevance of specific DOD policy in shaping the defense industry, the break date analysis in this paper supports the general view that the consolidation of the defense industry would have occurred with or without the DOD's explicit approval. Our break analysis serves as a complement to Hensel (2007), Greenfield and Brady (2008) , Pages (1998) , Oden (1998) and others who have explored the role of DOD policy and economy-wide factors through quantitative means.
Moreover, the approach, identifying break dates to better understand the effects of government policy on industrial structure, may be fruitfully employed to consider other government policies meant to influence other sectors of the economy.
The next section of this paper describes the perspectives on defense-industry consolidation in greater detail. Section 3 describes the data, explains the structural break analysis, and presents and interprets the results. Section 4 concludes.
Defense-Industry Consolidation, DOD Policy, and the Economy
By 1993 the DOD was facing a budget that had been shrinking since the mid-1980s. capacity among its suppliers and rising costs, the DOD lent its support to the 3 A few studies have sought to identify structural breaks in defense-related data, though none has sought to use them to help explain the consolidation of the defense industry. Amara (2006) The policy, lacking popular appeal, came to be known as "payoffs for layoffs" (see Augustine (1997 Augustine ( , 2006 , Gholz and Sapolsky (1999-2000) , Markusen and Costigan (1999) , and
General Accounting Office (1995) for discussions of these events).
The decline of the defense budget, as displayed in Figure 1 , the DOD's policy decision in 1993, and a subsequent wave of mergers and acquisitions in the defense sector are suggestive of a DOD policy effect in shaping the industry. Figure 2 displays the wave of merger activity that occurred, showing the number of mergers in the defense sector against the total number for all sectors-other than defense-in the United States in the 1990s. 7 It appears that defense merger activity increased rapidly starting in 1995,
if not sooner, offering credence to the timing of events explicit in the DOD-policy-centric view. 8 Indeed, Chu and Waxman (1998) suggest the change in DOD policy was the dominant driver behind many of the mergers and acquisitions (see also Korb (1996) for discussion). In particular, Chu and Waxman (1998) cite the aerospace industry as prima 5 Through successive rounds of military base realignments and closures, the DOD was also seeking to consolidate its own operations. The year 1993 was, of course, also the first year of the Clinton Administration, and approximately two years after the end of the first Gulf War. 6 John Deutch, another then-high-ranking DOD official, articulated the change in a DOD memorandum dated July 1993. See General Accounting Office (1995) for details on the change in policy. 7 Figure 2 is based on a similar figure from Greenfield and Brady (2008) . In the version in this paper, the total merger and acquisition series excludes the defense component. In contrast, a "proponent" of the economy-centric view might suggest that the wave of mergers among defense firms was simply part of and driven by the same forces that drove the larger wave of mergers in the U.S. economy in the 1990s, observing the close correspondence between the two data series in Figure 2 , and perhaps even the 1980s. In the 1980s, for example, Flamm (1998) notes the defense industry had its share of merger activity over a period of time, prior to 1985, during which the defense budget was actually expanding. Over that same period, mergers and acquisitions in the U.S.
economy were occurring at a historically high rate (see Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) (2001), and providing a parallel example from another sector for perspective, is the consolidation of commercial banking in the U.S. that occurred over the decade. The number of commercial banks in the U.S. peaked in 1984 at approximately 14,500, and that number fell to just over 8,500 by the end of 1999 (see Wheelock and Wilson (2004) and Berger et al. (1999) for discussions of those developments).
capacity and lower costs-in other words, to deal with the DOD's articulated concerns (see Oden (1998) for a detailed discussion).
Indeed, as displayed in Figure 2 , the data on defense and economy-wide merger activity in the 1990s exhibit similar patterns. To better understand the connection in the data, Hensel (2007) compares the mergers and acquisition in the defense sector to those in the rest of the U.S. economy on the basis of both the total number and aggregate dollar value during the 1990s. She calculates correlations between the two series of approximately 0.65 and 0.94 for the total number and aggregate dollar value of mergers and acquisitions, respectively. She interprets the correlation evidence as supporting the notion that the merger activity was driven mostly by factors related to broader economy. Flamm (1998) , too, concludes that data on defense equipment investment as well as data on defense-related manufacturing do not support the general notion that the mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the 1990s were a "natural" outcome of the change in defense policy that occurred in the beginning of that decade. His analysis, like those of the broader economy, points to technological change as a driving force.
Ultimately, however, we would be remiss in presenting only the two stylized perspectives without considering the range of perspectives between them. In a study attempting to sort through the relative importance of broader economic forces, DOD spending, and DOD policy decisions, Greenfield and Brady (2008) implement a regression analysis on annual data spanning 1958-2006. They find that both economywide mergers and acquisitions and defense spending help to explain defense industry consolidation, but the 1993 changes in DOD policy do not.
Overall, the explanation for defense-sector consolidation likely lies somewhere between the stylized narratives, with economy-wide forces, the defense budget, and the DOD's actions playing a part, but it is as yet unclear how to order the importance of the various forces at work. 12 Oden (1998), for example, stresses a range of market forces, but also recognizes the DOD's support for consolidation played a role in advancing the 12 Even if the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s were "market extending" (as discussed in Oden (1998)) they might still have been responsive to a declining defense market, in-so-much-as firms were seeking new opportunities in new product markets through their diversification. Also, in a market in which the DOD is often the primary purchaser of particular goods or services, it can be difficult to separate spending from policy; arguably, spending is a manifestation of policy. Discussions of these points, particularly the role of defense spending, can be found in various defense-related and legal publications including Schwartz (1996) , Goodman (1998 ), Defense Science Board (1994 ), and Kramer (1999 .
mergers of the mid-1990s. Pages (1998), too, notes that the DOD's support for mergers and acquisitions, in particular, the encouragement and reimbursements, helped reinforce market trends. And while Greenfield and Brady's (2008) results downplay the significance of specific DOD policy actions, the simultaneity of changes in the broader economy and the defense budget makes it difficult to tell a simple story.
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In light of the two stylized explanations and the uncertainties surrounding the evolution of the defense-sector consolidation, in the next section we attempt to identify possible break points in various defense-related data. Structural break points may help clarify the relevance of DOD policy in comparison to general market forces in spurring change in the defense sector.
Structural Breaks in the Defense Industry
We apply the Perron (1998, 2003) methodology to identify structural breaks in our data and to better assess the narratives surrounding the consolidation of the defense industry. In this section, we explain the data, their sources, and the break test methodology; then, we discuss our results.
The Data
We work with an array of data intended to represent defense industry consolidation, defense spending, and economy-wide conditions, including mergers and acquisitions. Table 1 provides a list of data and data sources discussed in this section.
Data on Defense Industry Consolidation
We focus our assessment of defense industry consolidation on the concentration ratios of the top-4 and top-100 recipients of DOD prime contract awards, ranked by the net dollar value of their annual awards. Figure 3 displays the concentration ratio data, capturing general trends in the defense industry. The share of contracts awarded to the top-100 firms declines gradually until the mid-to-late 1990s while the top-4 ratio shows a noticeable increase beginning approximately in 1992.
We follow Greenfield and Brady (2008) who define the ratios as the top-4 and top-100 firms' shares of the net dollar value of all DOD contract awards in a given year.
They compute the ratios from two sources, a publicly available DOD database and an annual DOD publication. 14 A federal form, the "DD350," which is completed for each DOD contract action over a certain dollar threshold, provides the underlying data for each source. By merging the data from the two sources, they construct a consistent, annual time series spanning 1958 through 2006. The DD350 database has known limitations both in terms of coverage and reliability, but it is the best available means of identifying DOD's suppliers and calculating their market shares. series). Each series is deflated using the implicit price deflator available from the U.S. 
Break Tests
We use the statistical techniques of Perron (1998, 2003) which allow us to estimate multiple break dates without prior knowledge of when those breaks occur. Perron (1998, 2003) provide a least-squares based algorithm for estimating the unknown breaks, a series of significance tests for conducting inference, and suggestions for how to interpret the various tests (see also Andrews (1993) and Andrews, Lee and Ploberger (1996) for work underpinning their methods). In the interest of brevity, we provide insight to the intuition behind their approach and then refer the reader to Perron (1998, 2003) for more details.
Consider estimating the simple linear function, The break dates are found such that the optimization identifies a break date at any point in the sample, then searches over the remaining partitions until another break date is found and so on. Perron (1998, 2003) provide a more detailed explanation of the method for optimizing over each partition, essentially a grid search. Given the grid search has located one or more breaks, one then applies Perron's (1998, 2003) statistical tests to identify which breaks are statistically significant. Perron (1998, 2003) recommend choosing the break dates by testing the null hypothesis of m = 0 breaks versus the alternative of m = k breaks. This is done by evaluating the supF(m|0) and supF(m+1|m) tests. 21 Based on the application of these tests, one can then choose the number of breaks, and hence, the final model. The supF(m|0) generalizes the supF test detailed in Andrews (1993) to test for multiple break points. The supF test is motivated by the fact that in a hypothesis test of structural change, the break point, , appears as a parameter under the alternative hypothesis but not the null. Therefore, the usual Wald, LaGrange Multiplier (LM), or Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistics fail to have standard asymptotic properties (see Andrews (1993) and Andrews, Lee and Ploberger (1996) for discussion on this point). The supF(m|0) is constructed for a maximum number of specified m and compared to critical values provided by Bai and Perron (1998) . Tables 2 through 13 display the results of the supF(m|0) and supF(m+1|m) tests and the estimated break dates. In our application of the tests, we set the maximum number of possible breaks to four. 22 Table 14 summarizes the findings from Tables 2 through 13. In addition, Figure 4 reproduces the break date estimates displayed in Table 14 along with the estimated confidence intervals for each date.
The Results of the Break Tests
We apply a common template in reporting the results of the structural break tests. we report all significance tests at the 5-percent level. Lastly, we reserve contextual interpretation of estimated break dates until section 3.4. 23 We follow Timmerman (2001) in using these two simple model specifications, where the simplicity is motivated by a lack of a clear structural model underlying the various data processes. Higher autoregressive orders do not make a substantial difference in the estimated break dates, so we do not report results for additional models. 24 Greenfield and Brady (2008) model the concentration ratios with a deterministic time trend, implying the process is trend-stationary. Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests of stationarity support this choice. 25 Perron (1998, 2003) provide asymmetric confidence interval estimates.
Breaks in the Top-4 Concentration Ratio

Breaks in the Top-100 Concentration Ratio
respectively. If we include a time trend in the AR(0) model, we find an additional break in 1999, with 1995 and 2003 marking the confidence interval. In the AR(1) model, we find a break for the top-100 firms in 1990. However, the statistical support for this break is weaker than in the previous cases; the 1990 break is statistically significant only at the ten percent level, with a confidence interval spanning ten years. Tables 4 and 5 
Breaks in the Number of Subsidiaries of the Top-4 and Top-100 Firms
Breaks in the HHI Values for the Top-4 and Top-100 Firms
Tables 6 and 7 display the results for the HHI values for the top-4 and top-100 firms.
The break dates for the top-4 HHI value are nearly identical to those shown in Table 2 for the top-4 concentration ratio. Though if a trend term is included in the AR(0) model, the evidence is strongest for two breaks, one in 1995 and another in 1965; for the AR (1) model, the addition of a trend has no practical effect, 1992 is still statistically significant.
For the top-100 HHI value, the results are somewhat similar to the top-4 HHI value, but somewhat different from the top-100 concentration ratio. For the AR(0) model without a trend term, two breaks are found in 1964 and 1995. The AR(0) model with a trend also yields a 1995 break date, but the 1964 date is no longer significant. The 1995 break point is also found for the AR(1) model (both with and without a trend term). The 1995 break date differs from the 1990 date found for our measure of top-100 concentration, but, as shown in Figure 4 , the confidence intervals around the two dates overlap.
Breaks in the Aggregate Real Dollar Value of Awards to the Top-4 Firms, the
Top-100 Firms, and all DOD Contractors
For an initial consideration of defense spending, we test the real growth rate of the value of DOD contracts awarded to the top-4 and the top-100 firms. In addition, we test the real growth rate of the dollar value of all DOD prime contract awards.
We did not find any breaks in the top-4 series; however, Tables 8 and 9 display the results for the value of awards to the top-100 firms and to all DOD contractors, respectively. Table 9 , partially mimic the results for the value of awards to the top-100 firms. For the AR(0) models, the results are the same; however, we find no evidence of a break in either version of the AR(1) model.
Breaks in the Defense Budget Authority Data
For a second perspective on defense spending, we next look at DOD budget authority.
The results displayed in Table 10 provide some, albeit weak corroboration of a relationship between defense spending and industry consolidation. The growth rate of the series modeled as an AR (0) process without a trend presents statistical evidence of breaks in 1984 and 1996. However, these dates, found using Bai and Perron's (1998) global optimization procedure, are not confirmed by the sequential procedure. On the other hand, for the AR(0) model with trend, a break is found for 1998 and confirmed by the sequential procedure.
For a third and final perspective on defense spending, we also look at two NIPA defense categories, defense consumption and investment. Panel A of Table 11 displays the results for the test of the growth rate of real national defense consumption expenditures for the AR(0) and AR (1) Table   11 , we find breaks earlier in the sample period, in 1956 and 1972.
Breaks in Economy-Wide Indicators
As a primary indicator of economy-wide activity, we test for breaks in the series for economy-wide mergers and acquisitions. As displayed in Table 12 , we find evidence of a break in the number of mergers and acquisitions in 1995 in both the AR(0) and AR (1) models; we also find evidence of a break in 1969 in the AR (1) budget authority, fail to identify any statistically significant breaks; hence, we do not report the results of those tests.
Interpretation of the Break Dates
We focus the discussion of the results on the 1980s and the 1990s, with most confidence attached to the break dates in the 1990s. Watson (2002)). 28,29 Second, though confidence intervals are wide, the SupF tests and 27 Indeed, Gholz and Sapolsky (1999-2000) discuss the political resistance the DOD faced with its proconsolidation stance-resistance which the authors argue slowed the effectiveness of the policy. 28 Various authors, including Kim and Nelson (1999) Campbell (2005) the sequential procedure from the Bai and Perron (1998) provide strong statistical evidence that a break occurred at some point over that decade, which suggests the industry was evolving before the DOD decided to support consolidation.
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That the structure of the defense industry was undergoing change during the 1980s along with the rest of the U.S. economy is consistent with points noted by Flamm (1998) .
First, merger activity occurred during this period while the defense budget was still increasing, which is consistent with a wave of merger activity in the U.S. economy during the 1980s. And second, the mid-1980s is a well-recognized point at which the defense budget began to decline. Consistent with the latter fact are the breaks found in the defense budget authority data found tentatively in 1984 (or 1985 if a trend is included in the model), and in 1986 for the NIPA series on defense consumption expenditures (though the latter's confidence interval is wide). 31 The structural breaks in the defense budget data are relevant to both stylized explanations of defense-industry consolidation, but each explanation might offer a different interpretation of the breaks. The economycentric view might expect concurrent breaks if the breaks in defense spending were tied to larger economy-wide phenomenon. From the DOD-policy-centric perspective, the lag between the breaks in the fiscal data in the 1980s and the apparent surge in defense industry consolidation, might indicate the industry waited for a policy cue from the DOD, even if that cue came years after the decline in the budget began.
Given the inherent complexities of the defense industry and the forces that stand to affect it, one would not expect to side completely with either of the stylized narratives.
For example, the 1990 break date found for the top-100 ratio, with a confidence interval of 1988 to 1992, suggests the industry was evolving either in line with the economy-wide 29 In replication of those studies, in an earlier draft we applied the Perron (1998, 2003) method to the growth rates of real U.S. GDP, real private fixed investment, and total government spending from 1947 through 2007. The results generally accord with the findings of the literature: structural breaks are evident at least from 1982 to 1985. 30 To look at the 1980s further and to substantiate the Bai and Perron (1998) tests, we applied simple Chow break tests to the 1980s dates for the top-4 concentration ratio for the sub-sample 1958 to 1994 (once the 1995 break date is found, the Bai and Perron (1998) method then checks the sub-samples for additional breaks). The Chow results (not reported) agree with the Bai and Perron (1998) results in two respects-a break occurred in the data at some point in the 1980s, but depending on the particular specification, the break occurred as early as 1980 or as late at 1989. 31 Chow tests on the budget authority data match the results from Bai and Perron's (1998) SupF results reported in Table 10 -for the simple AR(0) model, a break occurs in 1984, but no breaks are confirmed for the other specifications. For the NIPA series, the Chow test confirms a break at some point in the 1980s.
structural forces apparent in the early 1980s, or simply as the defense budget began to shrink, or both. However, if the breaks in the industry data that are identified in the 1980s are considered in context with both the broader changes in the U.S. economy during that decade and the decline in the defense budget, the coincident and more precise break estimates found in the 1990s for the economy-wide merger data and the defense industry data seem more suggestive of the economy-centric explanation of events. On balance, the DOD's support for consolidation seems less consequential than a DODpolicy-centric view would otherwise hold.
Conclusion
Overall, the common structural breaks found for the defense-related and economy-wide In the least, as the defense budget declined steadily from 1985 to 1998, the break dates found here for the consolidation of the defense industry offer statistically identifiable points consistent with changes in the broader economy. Ultimately, our findings suggest that the DOD cannot effectively promote competition, spur innovation, or otherwise alter the shape of the defense industry through policy actions taken in isolation. Instead, the DOD would benefit from close consideration of economy-wide forces when it crafts its policies in this and future decades. The DOD may be the world's largest purchaser of many defense-related goods and services, but broader economic
forces may yet challenge its authority. Notes: SupF statistics estimated using Perron (1998, 2003) Bai and Perron (1998) . In choosing the number of breaks, column 2 establishes the existence of at least one break and column 4 provides a sequential test to test for more breaks given at least one exists--please see the text for more details. Column 6 displays the break dates as chosen by the sequential procedure. The results are generally the same if a trend term is included in each model unless otherwise noted (see the text for complete details on the results displayed here and in the subsequent tables). See Figure 4 for confidence intervals for each date.
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